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QUIS CUSTODIET:
DISESTABLISHMENT
AND STANDING TO SUE
THOMAS J. O'TooLE*

I

N A RECENT SURVEY

of the work of the Supreme Court, a distinguished

commentator observed: "The issue of state aid to religion has evoked
a volume of literature which is perhaps disproportionate to its importance." The literature to which he referred is equally applicable to
federal aid to religion and is directed principally to issues of education.
This was written shortly before the battle lines over federal aid to education began to take shape in anticipation of the legislative session of
1961. Since that time an enormous amount of material concerning sectarian schools and the public treasury has begun to flow. Even the
newspapers of the nation have become preoccupied with the constitutional issue. In view of this plethora of material, a survey of the problem
can hardly be justified. There remains, however, at least one significant
aspect of the question which has not received sufficient attention, and it
is of considerable practical significance at the present time. The question
is who may litigate an allegedly unconstitutional expenditure of tax revenues, and this is a truly critical issue in the light of current proposals.
The background of the problem is well summarized in the classic case
of Frothingham v. Mellon. 2 In that case Mrs. Frothingham, suing as a
taxpayer, attempted to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from making
any expenditures to carry out the federal Maternity Act. The court disposed of the case by finding a lack of jurisdiction, and did not reach the
merits of the constitutional objections which the petitioner alleged vitiated the legislation. The court began by declaring: "The right of a taxpayer to enjoin the execution of a Federal appropriation act on the
ground that it is invalid and will result in taxation for illegal purposes,
has never been passed upon by this court. In cases where it was presented, the question has either been allowed to pass sub silentio, or the
determination of it expressly withheld." 3
* A.B., LL.B., M.A., Harvard University. Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.
I MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 250 (1960).
2 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
3 Id. at 486.
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Chief among the precedents to which the
4
court adverted was Bradfield v. Roberts,
in which a taxpayer and resident of the
District of Columbia sued to enjoin the
Treasurer of the United States from paying
any public funds to the directors of Providence Hospital, a corporation created
under Act of Congress. It was alleged that
this was a Catholic agency, and the grant
to the hospital would violate the first
amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed
the action of the Circuit Court of Appeals
in dismissing the bill. The Court was not
unconscious of the issue of standing to sue.
In the first sentence of the opinion we read:
"Passing the various objections made to
the maintenance of this suit on account of
an alleged defect of parties, and also in
regard to the character in which the complainant sues, merely that of a citizen and
taxpayer of the United States and a resi"5
dent of the District of Columbia ...
Again in the closing sentence we find:
"Without adverting to any other objections
to the maintenance of this suit, it is plain
that complainant wholly fails to set forth a
cause of action....

6

It is clear that the Court was correct
when, in the Frothingham case, it said the
issue of standing to sue had not been decided in the Bradfield case. In similar fashion, the Court had passed the same issue
in Millard v. Roberts,7 another suit to enjoin the Treasurer of the United States from
expending tax revenues for an allegedly
unconstitutional purpose, in this case the
relocation of railroads in the District of
Columbia. The Court said: "We have assumed that appellant, as a taxpayer of the
District of Columbia, can raise the ques-
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5 Id. at 295.
6 id.at 300.
7

202 U.S. 429 (1906).
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tions we have considered but we do not
wish to be understood as so deciding."
The same technique was used in Wilson
v. Shaw,9 an extraordinary attempt by a
taxpayer to enjoin the Secretary of the
Treasury from executing fiscal acts in aid
of construction of the Panama Canal. The
opinion recites:
Many objections may be raised to the
bill. Among them are these: Does plaintiff
show sufficient pecuniary interest in the subject matter? Is not the suit really one against
the government, which has not consented
to be sued? ... We do not stop to consider

these or kindred objections; yet, passing
them in silence must not be taken as even
an implied ruling against their sufficiency.
We prefer to rest our decision on the general scope of the bill. 10
The bill was dismissed, and it is significant that this was the outcome in all those
cases in which the issue of standing to sue
was passed over in what can be described
only as articulate silence.
In Frothingham v. Mellon the Court was
not content to be silent, and declared flatly:
"We have reached the conclusion that the
cases must be disposed of for want of
jurisdiction, without considering the merits
of the constitutional questions.""1 The
Court viewed the Bradfield case as one
directed against the District of Columbia,
and subject to the rule that resident taxpayers may sue to enjoin an illegal use of
moneys of a municipal corporation, just as
shareholders may sue a private corporation. 12 The Court went on to say:
But the relation of a taxpayer of the
United States to the Federal government is
very different. His interest in the moneys
id. at 438.
9 204 U.S.24 (1907).
10Id. at 31.
11262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923).
8

4 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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of the Treasury - partly realized from taxation and partly from other sources - is
shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and undeterminable; and the
effect upon future taxation of any payment
out of funds so remote, fluctuating, and uncertain; that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of
13
equity.
It is this doctrine to which the Court has
consistently adhered, and which makes it
clear that a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the
execution of any federal legislation granting funds to church-related schools cannot
be maintained. The same doctrine applies
to the use of state tax revenues, but the
exception in cases of smaller taxing units is
still maintained. The distinction can be
shown in two New Jersey cases, both raising first amendment questions. In the famous litigation over bus rides, 14 the public
money involved came from township board
of education revenues. While a state statute
authorized local school boards to provide
for transportation, the money came from
local taxes. The suit was instituted by a
taxpayer in the township, and his standing
to raise the issue was not questioned by the
Supreme Court.
On the other hand, in the Doremus1 '
case, a taxpayer and a parent of a school
child, were denied standing to sue to obtain a declaratory judgment that reading
the Bible in the public schools was unconstitutional. The New Jersey Supreme Court
was doubtful about the plaintiffs' standing
and gave expression to these doubts: "Apparently the sole purpose and the only function of plaintiffs is that they shall assume
the role of actors, so that there may be a
suit which will invoke a court ruling upon
Id. at 487.
14 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
"5Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429
13

(1952).

the constitutionality of the statute." 16 Nevertheless, the New Jersey court decided the
case on its merits. But the United States
Supreme Court again followed the Mellon
rule and refused to render a decision on
the substantive issues. It explained the
Everson case this way: "But Everson
showed appropriation or disbursement of
school district funds occasioned solely by
the activities complained of. This complaint
does not." 17 It should be noted that the
child of the plaintiff who sued as a parent
had graduated from the school before the
appeal was presented, hence only the
plaintiffs' status as taxpayers could be used
to establish qualification as proper parties.
Although three members of the Supreme
Court dissented from the refusal to hear
the Doremus case, in their minority opinion
they agreed that the case could not be
heard if it involved a federal statute.' 8 The
Court was therefore unanimous in adhering to the Mellon case.
A few words should be said about two
other first amendment cases, because they
illustrate the limits of the doctrine of standing-to-sue and serve to demonstrate the
impossibility of testing a federal aid-toeducation bill directly. In the McCollum 9
case the Court found a violation of the
Constitution in the teaching of religion on
public school property. The suit was maintained by a mother of a child in the school.
She purported to sue both as a parent and
as a taxpayer. Her child elected not to
attend religion classes. Writing for the
Court, Mr. Justice Black summarily rejected the claim that the appellant lacked
16 Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 439,

75 A.2d 880, 881 (1950).
17 Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434
(1952).
18 Id. at 435.
19 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948).
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standing to sue. In a concurring opinion,
Mr. Justice Jackson wrote: "I think it is
doubtful whether the facts of this case
establish jurisdiction in this Court ...."20
Mrs. McCollum alleged that her child was
humiliated by being set apart when he
declined to attend the religion classes. Apparently, to the majority of the Court this
effect on the child was sufficient to provide
standing to sue. In any event it should be
noted that this case like the Everson case,
involved a local school board. If the diversion of a measurable amount of tax funds
could be shown to have been made, the
taxpayer's standing would be beyond
dispute.
An interesting sidelight on the McCollum case is that Mr. Justice Black, in summarily rejecting the objection raised to the
petitioner's standing, cited only one case.
The case which he chose was Coleman v.
Miller,21 in which a divided Court found
that a group of Kansas legislators had
standing to contest the action of the Secretary of State of Kansas in endorsing as
approved a state resolution on the proposed
Child Labor Amendment. Yet in that case
Justice Black joined in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter asserting that the petitioners had no standing to sue. The point was
expressed vigorously and bluntly:
We can only adjudicate an issue as to
which there is a claimant before us who has
a special, individualized stake in it. One who
is merely the self-constituted spokesman of
a constitutional point of view cannot ask us

to pass on

it.22

The precedent of the McCollum case on
the issue of standing appears to have been

followed in Zorach v. Clauson.2 3 In a foot20

id. at 232.

21 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
22

Id. at 467.

23

343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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note Mr. Justice Douglas recited: "No
problem of this Court's jurisdiction is posed
in this case since, unlike the appellants in
Doremus v. Board of Education .

.

. ap-

pellants here are parents of children currently attending schools subject to the
released time program. ' 24 This point had
gone largely, but not entirely, unnoticed in
the New York courts. It is clear that although the Zorach case never went to trial,
the New York courts decided it on the
merits. 25 Only Judge Desmond was heard
to complain about whether there were
proper parties and he admitted that at least
one earlier case 26 appeared to accept parents as per se proper parties. However, he
suggested that the point should be re-examined. 27 Once again we have a case which
is clearly distinguishable from any involving the use of public funds in private
schools.
Although not involving issues of nonestablishment, some of the litigation in the
New Deal period is useful in demonstrating
the notion of standing to sue as it affects
the existence of a case or controversy. In
Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA 28 the
Supreme Court dismissed a bill to enjoin
the T.V.A. from generating and selling
electricity in competition with the appellants. Any injury they might suffer through
24 Id. at 309 n.4.

25 The petition was dismissed "on the merits as a
matter of law." Zorach v. Clauson, 198 Misc. 631,
99 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aft'd, 278 App.
Div. 573, 102 N.Y.S.2d 27 (2d Dep't), afl'd, 303
N.Y. 161, 100 N.E.2d 463 (1951).
26 People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N.Y. 195,
156 N.E. 663 (1927). See also Lewis v. Spalding,
193 Misc. 66, 85 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 1948),
appeal withdrawn, 299 N.Y. 564, 85 N.E.2d 791
(1949).
27 Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 176, 100
N.E.2d 463, 470 (1951).
28 306 U.S. 118 (1939). See also Alabama Power
Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478 (1938).
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competition was not a basis for standing to
sue. A taxpayer who seeks to enjoin a
federal expenditure is even further removed
from the potentiality of harm which can
29
make him a qualified adverse party.
On the other hand, a special tax tied to
a regulatory scheme may be viewed as not
truly a tax but merely a regulatory device.
When this is so, the affected party has
standing to sue. It was on this basis that
the Agricultural Adjustment Act was successfully attacked. 30 Whether this precedent
would still be followed 3' need not concern
us, because the proposals for federal aid to
education do not fit this pattern.
Several of the witnesses testifying before
the House and Senate Committees on the
federal aid-to-education proposals have
suggested that if aid to church-related
schools is included, Congress provide for a
32
judicial test of the constitutional question.
From what has been said already it should
be clear that Congress cannot do this. The
lack of standing to sue goes to the existence
of a case or controversy, and without a
case or controversy there is no judicial
power. The Court has predicated its refusal
to hear taxpayers' suits not on a policy of
abstention, but on an interpretation of
29Williams v. Riley, 280 U.S. 78 (1929). "The
complainant must possess something more than a
common concern for obedience to law." Western
Pac. Cal. R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co., 284 U.S.
47, 51 (1931).
30United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
"We conclude that the act is one regulating agricultural production; that the tax is a mere incident
of such regulation and that the respondents have
standing to challenge the validity of the exaction."
Id. at 61.
31 See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22
(1953); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1940); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20
(1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918).
32 See column by Anthony Lewis, N. Y. Times,
March 29, 1961, p. 22, col. 6.

Article 111.33
The classic example of a congressional
attempt to create a judicial case is found in
Muskrat v. United States.34 Congress by
statute 35 expressly authorized two members
of the Cherokee Indian tribe to sue the
United States on their own behalf and on
behalf of all other Cherokee citizens having
a like interest. The purpose of the suits
was to examine the constitutionality of certain legislation purporting to affect Cherokee property rights. Leaving no doubt
concerning jurisdiction, the statute provided: "And jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the court of claims, with the
right of appeal, by either party, to the Supreme Court of the United States, to hear,
determine, and adjudicate each of said
suits."

36

The Court rejected the suits, denying it
had a revisory power over the action of
Congress. Only when rights of litigants in
justiciable controversies come before the
Court can an issue of constitutionality be
properly framed. The Court held that the
judicial power under the Constitution does
33 Cases cited notes 15, 28, 29 supra. In Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) the Court
said:
"The functions of government under our system
are apportioned. To the legislative department has
been committed the duty of making laws; to the
executive the duty of executing them; and to the
judiciary, the duty of interpreting and applying
them in cases properly brought before the courts.
The general rule is that neither department may
invade the province of the other and neither may
control, direct or restrain the action of the other.
...We have no power per se to review and annul
acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered
only when the justification for some direct injury
suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable
issue, is made to rest upon such an act." Id. at 488.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, §1.
34 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
35 Act of March 1, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015.
36 Ibid.
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not extend to any such congressional at37
tempt to obtain a declaration of validity.
Unless the Muskrat case is overruled, it
seems impossible to obtain judicial review
by any legislative clause purporting to authorize a suit. The rule of this case is completely in accord with the entire body of
doctrine concerning cases and controversies, 38 and parties thereto, and the authority
of the Muskrat opinion has never been
39
doubted.
Indeed, we may see the limits to which
Congress can go in enlarging the jurisdiction of the courts if we look at the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act 40 and cases de"The exercise of this, the most important and
delicate duty of this court, is not given to it as a
body with revisory power over the action of Congress, but because the rights of litigants in justiciable controversies require the court to choose
between the fundamental law and a law purporting to be enacted within constitutional authority,
but in fact beyond the power delegated to the
legislative branch of the government. This attempt
to obtain a judicial declaration of the validity of
the Act of Congress is not presented in a 'case'
or 'controversy,' to which, under the Constitution
of the United States, the judicial power alone
extends." Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346,
361 (1911).
38 The Muskrat case merely follows a precedent
resulting from Hayburn's Case, I U.S. (2 Dall.)
8 n.1 (1792). Congress had authorized the Supreme Court to examine pension claims and some
of the judges refused. The Act of Feb. 28, 1793
was passed, authorizing a suit to test the validity
of non-judicial action by the judges. The story of
this episode is recounted in I WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 69-83
(rev. ed. 1926). Willoughby claimed that the requirement of proper parties was a rule born not
of constitutional necessity but of the Court's own
"sense of propriety and necessity." I WILLOUGHBY,
37

THE

CONSTITUTION

OF

LAW

OF

THE

UNITED

STATES 12-13 (1910). He makes the point without
citation of any authorities.
39 Falling outside the ambit of the doctrine are
cases in which the petitioner is a voter seeking to
protect his franchise. Lesar v. Garnett, 258 U.S.
130 (1922).
40 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1958), as amended, 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. 1, 1960).
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cided under it. 4 ' In the language of the Act

itself, as well as in the cases, an actual controversy is required; and a controversy
requires parties in the traditional sense.
The only conclusion which can be drawn
is that the current proposals for judicial
42
review by legislative fiat will fail.

What happens to constitutional considerations when Congress is considering legislation which cannot be tested in litigation?
It is a paradox of historical development
that the commanding position of the Supreme Court on issues of constitutionality,
so much disputed at its origin, 43 has become so familiar that perplexity arises when
the Court's power is inoperative. What
should happen is what was clearly intended
when the Constitution was written: the
members of Congress and the President,
joining in the legislative process, should
make conscientious judgments of their own
on the constitutional issues.
First let it be made clear that this is not
an effort to renounce the Supreme Court.
One spokesman has been reported as urg41 E.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S.
277 (1937).
42 One method of raising the issue in a true case
or controversy can be imagined. If an administrative officer (in the Department of Health, Welfare and Education or in the Treasury Department)
refused to execute legislation authorizing payments
to church-related schools, a school adversely affected could seek a mandatory injunction against
the official. See National Radio School v. Marlin,
83 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ohio 1949). Even in this
situation the officer cannot insist upon the unconstitutionality of the statute since no injury to him
results from the alleged unconstitutionality. See
Smith v. Indiana ex rel. Lewis, 191 U.S. 138
(1903). Note, The Power of a State Officer to
Raise a Constitutional Question, 33 COLUM. L.
REv. 1036 (1933). In any event, an attempt by
Congress to create this situation by legislating that
there be a refusal to pay in order to raise a case
would fall with the rule of the Muskrat case.
43

WARREN,

THE

SUPREME

COURT IN UNITED

STATES HISTORY 204-68 (rev. ed. 1926).
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ing something in that vein, and has said:
"There is no justification in surrendering
democratic judgment to the Supreme Court
on an issue as basic as this." 4 But if this
were a justiciable issue in which proper
parties could join in a genuine controversy,
there can be no doubt that the Court's ruling would be determinative and could be
upset only by constitutional amendment or
subsequent reversal by the Court.
The constitutional imperatives concerning non-reviewable legislation are basically
not different from those concerning reviewable legislation. Fidelity to the Constitution
is a duty which is not exclusive. All three
branches of the government are occupied by
persons sworn to uphold and defend our
basic law.45 In any of its actions, the Con-

gress is under obligation to respect constitutional limitations. The quantum of this
duty is technically the same regardless of
the possibility of judicial review. When the
Supreme Court in the Mellon case decided
it had no power to review, it was not freeing Congress from constitutional imperatives. Indeed, it is fair to say that the lack
of opportunity for judicial review should
serve to emphasize the duty of the legislature and the executive to respect the Constitution. When the Supreme Court decides
issues concerning the constitutionality of
legislation it is not asserting a power to
control the Congress; it is merely performing the judicial function in a constitutional
way.
The point which is being made is so
fundamental as to seem obvious. Yet in
recent years it has been somewhat obscured
by at least two kinds of developments. One
Jerome Nathanson, administrative leader of the
New York Society for Ethical Culture as quoted
in The New York Times, April 17, 1961, p. 26,
col. 1.
45 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; art. VI.
44

is the tendency to stretch the judicial power
beyond the ordinary scope of true cases and
46
controversies raised by proper parties.
The other is the defense of judicial review
rationalizations. 47

by neo-orthodox

Our

earliest commentators on the Constitution
did not misunderstand the situation. Rawle
speaks first of the legislature's own obligation to respect the Constitution. 4S After
declaring: "This is, therefore, the great
restraint, ' 49 he then speaks of judicial review as a second restraint, with the pover
of the electorate as a third restraint, operating only ultimately.
A full statement of this view can be
found in Storey's Commentaries:
The Constitution, contemplating the
grant of limited powers, and distributing
them among various functionaries, and the
state governments, and their functionaries,
being also clothed with limited powers, subordinate to those granted to the general government, whenever any question arises, as
to the exercise of any power by any of these
functionaries under the state, or federal goverriment, it is of necessity, that such functionaries must, in the first instance, decide
upon the constitutionality of the exercise of
such power. It may arise in the course of
the discharge of the functions of any one,
or of all, of the great departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and
the judicial. The officers of each of these
departments are equally bound by their
oaths of office to support the Constitution
of the United States, and are therefore conscientiously bound to abstain from all acts,
46 See a discussion of some aspects of this question
in

FREUND,

ON

UNDERSTANDING

THE

SUPREME

COURT 82-116 (1951).
47 E.g., BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND

THE COURT

(1960). In this study of judicial review the Supreme Court is said to exercise a "legitimating"
function. Presumably government action can be
viewed as legitimate only when it qualifies for
Court approval.
A VIEW

48 RAWLE,

(2d ed. 1829).
49 d. at 284-85.

OF THE CONSTITUTION

284

7
which are inconsistent with it. Whenever,
therefore, they are required to act in a case,
not hitherto settled by any proper authority,
these functionaries must, in the first instance, decide, each for himself, whether,
consistently with the Constitution, the act
can be done. If, for instance, the President
is required to do any act, he is not only
authorized, but required, to decide for himself, whether, consistently with his constitutional duties, he can do the act. So, if a
proposition be before Congress, every member of the legislative body is bound to examine, and decide for himself, whether the
bill or resolution is within the constitutional
reach of the legislative powers confided to
Congress. And in many cases the decisions
of the executive and legislative departments,
thus made, become final and conclusive, being from their very nature and character
incapable of revision.50

A question remains concerning the role
judicial precedents should play in the judgment which the Congress and the President
must make for themselves. Should they
seek an answer to this question: "What
would the Supreme Court decide concerning the constitutionality of this bill if the
question were now before the Court as a
justiciable issue?" Or should they instead
ask what is their own private judgment on
the question of constitutionality (after an
examination of court decisions and other
sources of enlightenment)? 51 These two
different ways of framing the issue may
00 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 374 (1st ed. 1833).

51 Jefferson took an unequivocal position. "The

second question, whether the judges are invested
with exclusive authority to decide on the constitutionality of a law, has been heretofore a subject
of consideration with me in the exercise of official
duties. Certainly there is not a word in the constitution which has given that power to them more
than to the executive or legislative branches. Questions of property, of character and of crime being
ascribed to the judges, through a definite course
of legal proceeding, laws involving such questions
belong, of course, to them; and as they decide on
them ultimately and without appeal, they of course

CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER

1961

have critical consequences on the substantive answer which emerges. This is particularly true where the Court itself has been
sharply divided, as is true in the recent
non-establishment cases. Different members of Congress and different Presidents
may feel varying degrees of obligation to
try to give the same answer the Court might
give. It is probably correct to say that
the commanding role which the Court has
come to occupy in the formation of public
opinion on constitutional questions transcends its technical jurisdiction over cases
and controversies. But a proper reading of
the Constitution and various historical examples can be used to sustain the right
(indeed, the duty) of the Congress and the
President to make independent judgments.
At least this much is clear - the constitutional issues surrounding proposed legislation should not be reduced to merely
political issues, for politics in the legislative
halls should operate only within the range
of measures and counter-measures which
Congress can honorably declare do not
violate the fundamental law of the land.
decide for themselves. The constitutional validity
of the law or laws again prescribing executive
action, and to be administered by that branch
ultimately and without appeal, the executive must
decide for themselves also, whether, under ther
constitution, they are valid or not. So also as to
laws governing the proceedings of the legislature,
that body must judge for itself the constitutionality
of the law, and equally without appeal or control
from its co-ordinate branches. And, in general,
that branch which is to act ultimately, and without
appeal, on any law, is the rightful expositor of the
validity of the law, uncontrolled by the opinions
of the other co-ordinate authorities. It may be
said that contradictory decisions may arise in such
case, and produce inconvenience. This is possible,
and is a necessary failing in all human proceedings. Yet the prudence of the pulic functionaries
and authority of public opinion, will generally
produce accommodation." VI THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 461-62 (Washington ed.
1854).

